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ON THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION COMMUNITY
"Multiple entry is now the norm for U.S.
international air transportation, except in cases
in which the bilateral aviation relations between
the United States and the foreign country
concerned call for a different approach. This
basic policy is founded on broad economic
considerations which have been thoroughly
evaluated in Congress and in the Board's
adjudicatory processes. It was recently given
explicit Congressional sanction by the
International Air Transportation Competition
Act. Objectors to multiple entry now have a
heavy burden of proof to show that application of
the policy would be inconsistent with the public
convenience and necessity.
"Bermuda has not met that burden."
That is a quote from pages 3 and 4 of the Civil Aeronautics
Board's decision in the United States-Bermuda Show Cause
Proceeding, adopted May 13, 1980, and sent to the President on
May 20, 1980.
I understand from Professor Cary that most of you ladies and
gentlemen are from civil aviation authorities or airlines from
outside of the United States. Well, when you go home you will be
faced with this U.S. policy as a fait accompli in your dealings
with the United States. It is a policy consciously adopted by
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the Administration and the Congress and, rightly or wrongly, it
is here. Since you must deal with it, I should like to spend
some time this afternoon discussing how it got started, second,
taking a look at some of the results to date, and, third, raising
some questions which need to be answered.
Since so-called airline deregulation got started and is
still being developed in our domestic aviation, you may well ask
why should you, in the foreign countries, worry about or follow
the machinations of domestic U.S. aeronautical authorities.
Professor Cary advises me that is a common question from foreign
students in the MIT program.
Well the reason why you have to pay attention was well
stated by Claude Taylor, President and Chief Executive Officer of
Air Canada and President of IATA, when he spoke to the Interna-
tional Aviation Club in Washington this past May 20. He said:
"No one in aviation can escape the fact that
the United States is one of the world's super
powers. No one in the airline industry disputes
the fact that the United States is the seat of
the most powerful economy the world has ever
seen, despite your current recession.
"Temporary recessions, momentary setbacks
may cloud our understanding of these basic facts
from time to time, but we should never deceive
ourselves about the underlying realities.
"That is why the world takes U.S. inter-
national aviation policies so seriously. It is
why the world pays close attention to U.S.
domestic policies in fields which impinge on
foreign concerns - such as your domestic
deregulation policy for commercial aviation.
"As a Canadian I know the impact of your
actions is inescapable. As President of a
worldwide trade association, I am vividly aware
of the importance of your policy and activities
in international air transport."
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So the answer is if you want to know what is going to happen
internationally in air transportation, watch closely what happens
in U.S. domestic air transportation. Let me give you some con-
crete examples.
The first phase of domestic deregulation involved the
certification of every carrier which wanted any particular route
regardless of the number of applicants. Even before the 1978
amendments to the Federal Aviation Act, the Civil Aeronautics
Board threw out some 40 years of experience and history of
selecting only that number of carriers for each route that could
operate economically. Instead, it suddently started granting
multiple permissive authority to all applicants -- that is, any
carrier who applied got the route but did not have to serve if it
did not want to.
The quotation I opened my presentation with shows that this
has now been carried over as the norm for international route
cases as well -- at least from the U.S. side.
Next, on the domestic scene, the Board entered upon what
could be called "area" cases such as the Oakland Case, the
Birmingham Case, and the Service to Midway Cases. Under that
type of 'approach, the Board would consider and, of course, grant,
applications from any and all carriers for service from any point
in the United States to the focal city, or airport.
Although that started as a domestic policy, recent press
reports indicate that this same approach is under consideration
by the Board for service from the United States to Germany and to
Paris. The Paris proceeding was to have been considered in a
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closed Board meeting the day before yesterday but was taken off
at the last minute. If the press reports are accurate, the Board
proposes to grant certificates to any applicant for service to
the foreign country with a certificate description "point or
points in the United States" rather than naming limited U.S.
gateways for service as has been done in the past.
Another example, of carry-over of domestic policy to the
international arena and one of long standing, is the Board's
imposition of Denied Boarding Compensation -- or, DBC -- Rules on
the industry. Originally, those so-called consumer protection
rules were applicable only to U.S. carriers but subsequently were
extended to cover foreign carriers as well. The extension to
foreign carriers has engendered no little controversy. Although
most if not all foreign carriers did not contest the original
application of domestic DBC Rules to them, they and their
governments became extremely upset when the Board proposed to
apply far more stringent rules and with extra-territorial
application. That is, they would apply on flights of the foreign
carrier departing its home country and destined for the United
States. After the rash of objections filed by foreign carriers
and fore'ign governments, the Board backed down -- on alleged
comity grounds -- but imposed severe notice burdens on those
foreign carriers which did not comply with the U.S. rules on
inbound flights. This was again challenged both in documents
filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board and by a group of foreign
air carriers who challenged the regulation in the courts. Again,
the Board backed down to some extent but the controversy is not
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yet settled and the language of the required notice is the
subject of yet another and still pending notice of proposed
rulemaking.
In this regard, however, it is interesting to note that
during one of the Board's sunshine meetings this past February,
one of the top staff suggested that DBC Rules are yet another
form of unnecessary regulation and should be abolished. The
argument was that most carriers for competitive reasons would
continue to compensate bumped passengers even if not required to
do so by the Civil Aeronautics Board. We are still awaiting a
formal proposal.
I should like to digress for a moment to use the DBC case as
an example of why foreign carriers and countries should exercise
their right to comment on proposed CAB actions despite the
feeling by some such carriers that filing comments are a waste of
time, money and effort. While the Board is often accused and, I
may say with some justification, of bulldozing its ideas through,
it is not completely insensitive (at least in the international
field) to strong and broad based objections from foreign carriers
and foreign countries. The DBC case is one example. Another is
the Board's IATA Show Cause Proceeding which appears to be in
limbo for a couple of more years.
That case was a proceeding where the Board tentatively
determined to disapprove the IATA resolutions as a result of
which U.S. carriers would effectively be excluded from traffic
conferences and indeed the traffic conferences themselves might
well go down the drain because antitrust immunity for fare levels
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and service arrangements would be withdrawn. Practically the
whole international aviation community got up in arms, not only
through IATA, its trade association, but by individual carrier
filings and strong representations by foreign governments through
the U.S. Department of State. Subsequently, the Board set up
three overseas meetings where foreign governments could make oral
presentations and the Board got bloodied at every one of them.
The long and short of it is that except for the North Atlantic,
the IATA Conference system will continue in full force and effect
for at least another couple of years at which time the Board has
signaled it will take another look. I shall have more to say
about the North Atlantic situation later on this afternoon, but
suffice it to say, foreign comment did have a positive effect on
the Board's approach.
One last example in connection with the efficacy of foreign
comment is the Board's pending notice of proposed rulemaking with
respect to insurance requirements. Under that proposal, the
Board would regulate the level of insurance a U.S. or foreign air
carrier must carry and would even require the insurance to be
written by a company or group authorized to do business in the
United States. The flood of comment from foreign sources on
those proposals has been wonderful to behold and I cannot but
believe that it will have a positive effect.
But back to deregulation and how the Board's domestic
actions are impacting the foreign arena.
The next area is, of course, that of fare regulation or
deregulation. Here the Board has been extremely cautious in
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allowing upward fare flexibility. More importantly, during this
time of double digit inflation and out-of-hand fuel cost
increases the Board has been niggardly in approving fare
increases. This has been true both in the domestic and inter-
national fields and has been, in my view, a function of the
Board's unwillingness fully to trust so-called market economics.
The Board has been more than willing to allow extreme cut-rate or
giveaway schemes, calling it free market competition and advan-
tageous to the consumer. But on the upward side, it has kept a
tight lid and has limited fare increases below those proposed as
essential by the carriers themselves. In recent weeks, however,
the Board has started to lift the lid both domestically and
internationally although more so in the domestic area. For
example, the Board recently announced a domestic policy that for
routes under 200 miles, there is no lid on fare increases. For
routes between 200 and 400 miles, an increase of 50 percent above
the so-called Standard Industry Fare Level would be o.k. and for
routes over 400 miles an increase of 30 percent above the
Standard Industry Fare Level would not be challenged.
I would suggest to you that this sudden flexibility on the
up side is not so much a belief in market forces as it is a
manifestation of the old military "It didn't happen on my watch"
syndrome. Recent financial results for U.S. carriers, both
domestically and internationally, have been disastrous. For the
first quarter of this year, only two trunk carriers, Delta and
Eastern, showed an operating profit with all the rest of the
trunk industry experiencing massive losses, many in the $40 to
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$70 million range. For international services, a summary I
recently saw showed over $100 million operating loss. While the
first quarter traditionally has been a poor one for the U.S.
international carriers, it has never been this bad before. Also,
the U.S. Air Transport Association estimates that 1980 will be
the worst year ever for U.S. carriers no matter how you look at
it.
This must be rather frightening for the deregulators who
have been accused of not allowing the carriers to raise their
fares sufficient to take account of massive cost increases. Mrs.
Bailey, a current member of the Civil Aeronautics Board, recog-
nized this fact in a sunshine meeting in early May and would have
allowed extra increases immediately because of the carriers' poor
first quarter financial results. And most recently, Mr. Cohen,
the present Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, who I under-
stand will be speaking to you next week, told the Aviation
Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce Committee:
"During the debate on deregulation, Dr. Kahn
and other proponents stated quite bluntly that a
number of carriers might not survive under dereg-
ulation and would disappear either through
merger, voluntary liquidation or bankruptcy.
These possibilities are recognized and acceptable
risks of doing business in a competitive market.
An unacceptable risk would be for a carrier to be
forced out of business, not as a result of
competition, but because of federal economic
regulatory policy."
Mr. Kahn is no longer with the Civil Aeronautics Board so he
can disclaim any responsibility for current failures and disrup-
tions in the air transportation industry. But I have at least
some suspicion that the sudden recognition by the present Board
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of the necessity of deregulating fares when economic operating
authority was for all intents and purposes long ago deregulated,
is a desire similarly to be able to avoid blame. This is not to
say that they are wrong. No, I think they are right because if
there is effective freedom of entry and exit from markets, there
must be full freedom in the pricing field as well. It is just
that it has taken the Board far too long to get to that position.
I think it might be well now to turn to some of the philos-
ophy of deregulation and how and why it got started.
In the early to mid-1970's, a number of academicians started
to question the validity of the pervasive regulation of air trans-
portation that existed at that time. Subsequently as a result of
real or perceived problems with the way the Civil Aeronautics
Board had administered the Act in the early to mid-1970's, some
members of Congress as well as in the Ford, and subsequently the
Carter Administrations, pushed deregulation theories. Some of
the underlying concerns involved a so-called route moratorium --
that is, you couldn't even get a hearing on a new route
application;
They involved questionable long term Board approval of
capacity control agreements;
They involved stringent control on price competition,
including dictation of fare philosophy and setting strict.pricing
rules supposedly to ensure the entire public was treated the same
and fairly; and
They involved complaints as to intolerable administrative
delays.
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Be that as it may, legislation was introduced into both Houses of
Congress and culminated in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.
During the period of controversy, the U.S. airlines them-
selves did not present a common front as to what they considered
appropriate legislation to be. United Air Lines, the largest of
the U.S. carriers, broke ranks after a while and actively sup-
ported and encouraged full deregulation. In my view, United did
this thinking it to be in its own best interests. You see,
because of its huge size, United had not received major new route
authority in the then recent past years. United apparently
thought that deregulation was the only way to get into new major
markets which it wanted to serve. Some other carriers joined
United's approach in varied respects, although many carriers
opposed deregulation quite vehemently.
The fight in Congress was a dispute not so much of deregu-
lation, but rather of basic philosophy. It was a dispute as to
whether airlines are like the corner grocery store or any other
business or whether airlines have a public utility aspect which
requires preservation and some amount of regulation. As present
Chairman Cohen told both the International Civil Aviation
Conference sponsored by Lloyds of London Press in New York on
April 30 and the Intitute of Air Transport in Paris on May 21st:
"Airlines are not unique in this respect. Despite
what many of us might like to think, they are pri-
marily just another consumer service that should
operate in response to commercial realities."
I would only say in answer that even Adam Smith found that
common carrier transportation enterprises had a special public
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interest place which distinguished them from the run of the mill
business enterprise.
But the problem with the deregulation controversy, it seems
to me, is that those who are pushing deregulation in the U.S.
Government now are basically zealots. I think Michael Styles who
is Director of IATA's Washington Office and a former Director of
the U.S. Department of State's Aviation Office hit the nail on
the head earlier this month in a speech in Japan. He had put
forth a compromise position for the Japan-U.S. controversy to
focus on real problems which nations have, namely, market share,
industrial profitability and employment while at the same time
allowing competition in the marketplace to determine the quantity
and quality of airline service in all but extreme situations. He
was emphatic in suggesting that international aviation is never
going to accept the "survival of the fittest" doctrine, which
appears to be behind the U.S. aviation policies.
Mr. Styles anticipated that he would be castigated by
deregulation proponents who would say that:
"... interpretations of reality such as the one I
have just given, are easily-seen-through attempts
by the airline industry to preserve the old order
of selfish protectionism."
Styles then went on to make what I consider the important
point. He said:
"But they are wrong. It is not I who see
things as white or black--or in stark competition
versus protection terms. It is the theorists who
see things this way. The real world is a
spectrum of attitudes, goals and policies."
There is the problem. From the standpoint of the deregu-
lation theory, the deregulationists say "if you are not for me
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100%, you must be against me and therefore anything you say is
protectionism."
It is significant to note that Messrs. Douglas and Miller
who are two ardent reformers, in their book Economic Regulation
of Domestic Air Transport, Theory and Policy, said at p. 62 that
they "do not maintain that economic efficiency is inherently
superior to other policy objectives." Rather they said that P'the
extent to which other policy goals (such as equity, promotion of
aviation, national defense) should be considered, we leave for
others to determine." It is this balancing that I think has been
lost in the domestic area as a concomitant of the corner grocery
store approach to air transportation. But it is here where you
in the international field have a chance to bring back some
rationality. Indeed, the Board's newest member, Mr. Dalley, who
incidentally before coming to the Civil Aeronautics Board, was at
the U.S. Department of State, has indicated the necessity of
negotiating with an accommodation to the views of foreign
countries.
So I come back to what I suggested earlier as to the value
of submitting comments on proposed CAB regulations, and that is
that you should also not be hesitant about presenting your views
to the U.S. in connection with bilateral negotiations.
On the other hand, you have to recognize the validity.of
many of the things deregulationists espouse. Certainly, the old
CAB was far too cautious in authorizing new competitive services,
both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, most foreign
countries have been highly protectionist and encourage pooling
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agreements which have resulted in far less service and much
higher prices than we had in the United States even prior to
deregulation. It may also be true that open skies and open
pricing policy may be good for some countries such as those which
are trying to develop tourism, but even that is a policy
objective separate from open skies. The point I would make,
however, is that the increased competitiveness which the
deregulationists seek is a good thing so long as it is economic
and not destructive. I do question, though, whether complete
deregulation in the international field can ever be a reality
because of the differing views and economic needs of the many
nations involved.
Now let's turn to some of the results to date. The first
point is that we do not yet know whether deregulation is
working. Not only are all the facts not in, but true deregu-
lation has yet to be tried. I earlier discussed with you the
problem of the Board's failure to deregulate fares after route
entry and exist were deregulated, but we also have probems of
even greater regulation of the small commuter carriers, greater
regulation of small community service and certainly massively
greater regulation in the so-called consumer protection area. As
to this latter, it has intrigued me that if the theory of
deregulation is that market forces should govern, why all the new
consumer protection regulation?
Many of the deregulation proponents now claim that while
many carriers opposed deregulation initially, all carriers now
support deregulation, thus supposedly proving that deregulation
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is working. What they ignore (or possibly do not appreciate) is
the reason why carriers support full deregulation.
From my observations, they support full deregulation now
because partial deregulation has been a disaster particularly in
light of our present economy, and if route entry is to be open,
pricing and operational decisions must also be fully deregulated.
The industry has come to believe that no regulation whatsoever is
far preferable to the kinds of regulation now being indulged in
by the Civil Aeronautics Board. And it is only after full dereg-
ulation that we shall be able truly to tell whether deregulation
works.
Even the deregulation proponents have to admit that all the
answers are not in, but they do claim that results to date over-
whelmingly show that deregulation works. But is that really so?
James C. Miller, an economist and early proponent of deregulation
takes the affirmative side in an article in the March 26 Wall
Street Journal entitled "Is Airline Deregulation Working?"
To start with, Miller points to lower fares for the con-
sumer. Well, lower than what? Up until 1977, carriers were in
an effective straightjacket in terms of price competition imposed
on them by the Board's Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation
(DPFI). In that Investigation, some carriers, notably Delta and
TWA, had proposed a range-of-reasonableness approach within which
fare filings would not be suspended by the Board, but even that
limited area of competitiveness had not been adopted. As a
matter of fact, the DPFI restrictionism was not abandoned by the
Board until September, 1978. So how can they say that when fares
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were loosened up on the downside and carriers were allowed to
compete with lower fares, the Deregulation Act was the cause?
What I like to call "intelligent regulation" would also have
allowed that and would have afforded full competitiveness under
the old Act. Indeed, most of the price competition under
deregulation has taken the form of discount fares, a competitive
pricing technique that has existed for years under regulation,--
it is just more drastic now.
Next, Miller -- and he was joined in this argument by both
Chairman Cohen in his presentation to the Aviation Subcommittee
on May 20th as well as by William Johnson, Assistant Secretary
for Policy and International Affairs of the Department of
Transportation speaking before the Aero Club in Washington on
March 25th -- argues that deregulation is proven to be working
positively because recent average fares have risen more slowly
than the consumer price index in spite of drastically increased
fuel and other costs. But how can they claim that deregulation
is the cause of these lower fares when the Board itself has
refused to allow the carriers to raise fares as much as the
carriers asked for to be able to cover fuel and other cost
increases? If you hold fares down by regulation, how can you
claim that as a benefit of deregulation? You may want to ask
Chairman Cohen that question when he speaks to you next we.ek and
I dare say you will see some of the fanciest footwork since a
Fred Astaire/Ginger Rogers movie.
Miller then refers to productivity gains. Such gains are
unquestioned but it fairly may be asked whether the productivity
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gains would not in any event have occurred to meet sharply
increasing fuel costs as would higher average daily utilization
and higher load factors brought about by a temporary tight new
equipment situation. On the other hand, it appears that the
tight equipment situation was in part brought about by more open
entry by more carriers in more markets. The productivity gain
argument, then, I think is questionable for either side of the
deregulation proposition.
Profits. Miller and others rely heavily on the strong
profit showing in 1978. That is fine to say, but profits
plummeted in 1979 -- the first full year of deregulation -- and
the figures to date in 1980 are a disaster and have been forecast
for the full year 1980 to be the worst ever for the industry.
Don't forget, the bragged-about profits of 1978 occurred when the
economy was still strong and load factors high because of short-
age of equipment and were, for the most part, before the adoption
of the '78 Act. Furthermore, 1978 was before the effects of
route deregulation had been felt at all.
The deregulationists, of course, explain away the profit
turn around. Chairman Cohen in his presentation to the Aviation
Subcommittee on May 20th said: "The real spoiler has been the
price of fuel." But a spoiler of what? Fuel is one of the many
items that make up the cost of air transportation and if air
transportation is truly like any business or the corner grocery
store, why shouldn't air transportation just compete for fuel
based on relative economic value? A concomitant of that must, of
course, be the industry's ability to price its service free of
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governmental control. Indeed, isn't that the way the free
marketplace is supposed to work? And if that be so, how can fuel
costs be a spoiler of anything -- except maybe somebody's pet
theory?
Service to Small Communities. Miller and others point to
increased numbers of departures and frequency of service as a
result of deregulation. There has also been a tremendous
increase in commuter carrier operations and for many smaller
cities, this has indeed been a real boon. But the votes are not
all in as to the value of the new service regime as compared to
the old insofar as an integrated air transportation system within
the United States is concerned. Many smaller cities that used to
be served by two or more certificated carriers are now served by
only one, or even only by commuters. Furthermore, the use of
smaller commuter aircraft severely limits cargo capacity at
community airports as recognized in a letter drafted by the
Board's staff for the Chairman's signature in commenting on H.R.
6418 and S. 2245. The results of small community service, then,
are not an unmixed blessing and further analysis is required.
Airline Labor. The effect on airline labor has been insig-
nificant according to Miller. I think we shall have to wait for
a subsequent assessment of this aspect in view of the financial
results being experienced by the industry. For example, press
reports in the last two days have stated that both United and
Continental will be cutting back both service and personnel
drastically this fall.
- --.--- ---- - . . . . . . . .
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Subsidy. Miller argues that even with the essential service
program inaugurated by the 1978 Deregulation Act, the inflation
adjusted subsidy bill is now less than before. Here again, I
would not want to count on experience to date in view of what is
happening to traffic and profits in the industry. Also, the full
effect of the cost of the small community service program has not
been felt or assessed in light of current economics.
Industry Concentration. Miller says the only merger of any
consequence has been the Pan Am/National merger. He may not have
considered the North Central/Southern merger to be of any conse-
quence and he may have avoided mentioning the Flying Tiger/
Seaboard merger since it was not yet consummated. There also
would have been a Western/Continental Airlines combination if the
CAB had not artificially stepped in. And the time is just now
coming, because of the recession, to see if other mergers will be
necessary. I saw just recently that an Investment Analyst has
speculated that 6 of the present 10 trunk carriers may not be
able to make it. We already have another merger -- the pending
acquisition of Airwest by Republic, the name by which the merged
North Central and Southern is known. Certainly, there appears to
be a tendency towards increased concentration into fewer carriers
and this can be expected to become an even more serious problem
in view of recent financial results. On the other hand, one must
admit that such carriers as Air Florida, Southwest Airlines, PSA,
and Midway Airlines are newly federally certificated and are
competing well in interstate markets. It is my understanding
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that the first three are still financially sound, but Midway has
yet to show a profit.
Miller's final two points are the airline network and safe-
ty. As to the former, he has "not observed" any deterioration
although the votes can hardly be said to be in on that, pending
resolution of the current domestic airline financial crisis. As
to safety, I agree that there have been no accidents attributgble
to the effects of deregulation as such. I am, however, personal-
ly very nervous about this area because I remember some of the
safety problems associated with the non-scheduled airlines in the
early to mid-1950's.
Mr. Miller concluded his article as follows:
"The evidence thus far is overwhelmingly on
the side of the proponents of deregulation. By
1984, when the CAB is scheduled for extinction,
reasoned judgment may be on the other side. But
that would happen only if in the meantime the
industry experienced failures of disastrous
proportions."
I agree with the deregulationists that the full story is not
in. I disagree with them that the evidence thus far is over-
whelming on the side of the proponents of deregulation and when
they say it is, I think they brush over some very, very serious
problems. Indeed, I question whether some of the "failures of
disastrous proportions" which Mr. Miller apparently does not
foresee, may not really be just around the corner.
It bothers me too when the deregulationists say that some of
the present problems could not have been foreseen as of the time
the deregulation bills were pending in Congress. Certainly, con-
tinually rising fuel prices were known because of the actions of
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OPEC in the early to mid-1970's, and the possible overall adverse
impact on the system was specifically called to the attention of
Congress.
In this regard, I would like to read you a section from the
testimony of Richard S. Maurer before the Senate Aviation
Subcommittee in March of 1977. Mr. Maurer was then Sr. Vice
President-General Counsel, Secretary and a Director of Delta Air
Lines and is now Vice Chairman of the Board of that company. He
said:
"First, as I mentioned earlier, while Delta in-
dividually is confident of its ability to prosper
in a new regulatory climate, we are part of a
national system that could be torn apart by
sudden extensive change in the present statute.
We think this would result from simultaneous
provision for virtually mandatory grant of every
route application by a new or a smaller carrier;
for growth by existing carriers free of CAB con-
trol into new markets of choice; for replacement
of dormant authority without examination of
economics; for uncritical application of the
anti-trust laws to an industry which can best
meet many of its service functions on a uniform
basis achieved through exemption from those laws;
for summary administrative proceedings which
would not afford the protections of a public
hearing even in such basic areas as certificate
modification or revocation; and for a number of
other changes as well, as proposed in the two
bills now before you. While certain improvements
in some of these areas might be beneficial,
enactment and implementation of the entire
package would suddenly introduce the type of
turnover and instability which we think are
incompatible with the objectives of a common
carrier air transport system, and which could
result in concentration of whatever might survive
in the hands of only a few carriers approaching,
or even exceeding, the present size of United."
Mr. Maurer had earlier stated to the Subcommitee:
"Our concern is not entirely altruistic, however,
because Delta is a part of, and impacted by that
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system, and we are convinced that after such
destruction had been wrought, there would be
cries for new and more oppressive forms of
regulation, leading toward nationalization."
Having looked at some of the incomplete results we have to
date, Mr. Maurer's concerns appear to be valid indeed.
I should like to conclude my prepared remarks with the
raising of some questions which need to be answered, particularly
before deregulation can be accepted whole-heartedly in the inter-
national field.
To start with, I presume when the Board considers deregula-
tion in the international field, it would abolish IATA as a rate-
setting organization. It has, as I mentioned earlier, refused to
allow U.S. carrier participation in the rate-setting activities
of IATA over the North Atlantic. During the recent so-called
legislative hearings held by the Board in connection with the
IATA show cause order, the suggestion was made that absent the
IATA conference machinery, governments would get bogged down in
the details of rates and fares. Well, we now have an actual
instance of this problem. The United States and the Scandinavian
countries were in dispute over certain fare proposals of
Northwest Airlines and as a result, the Board withdrew approval
of an IATA rate agreement insofar as fuel-related increases would
have been allowed between the U.S. and the 'Scandinavian coun-
tries. The Board used the economic pressure of denial of fuel-
necessitated fare increases as a weapon to obtain approval of
certain Northwest fares which the Board thought ought to be
allowed. Without going into details, delegations representing
the governments of the U.S. and three Scandinavian governments
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met in Washington for ten days this past March. If my under-
standing is correct, there were ten members of the U.S. dele-
gation plus two technical advisors from the industry and ten
members of the Scandinavian delegation plus three technical
advisors from their industry. These twenty-five people spent the
better part of each of the ten days in reaching an agreement on
fares. The agreement involved specific dollar levels for the,
fares, it involved definitions of season, and detailed conditions
for certain fares, including group size, advance reservation
requirements, minimum length of stay and the like. You must
remember that technical advisors are generally not allowed to
attend negotiating sessions, so the government negotiators who
were not fare experts had to spend additional time briefing the
technical advisors who, in turn, briefed their airline princi-
ples, who in turn, fed a response to the technical advisors, who
in turn, rebriefed the negotiators, who in turn, went back to
negotiating sessions on specific fares. When you consider the
total time involved to discuss and determine fare proposals which
could far more easily have been worked out by intercarrier
negotiations in IATA, you get some idea of the massive waste of
government time as well as that of carrier personnel in reaching
this agreement.
I think a fair question to ask is whether that was an.
efficient and reasonable use of resources which can be expected
from deregulation in the international field. One answer will,
of course, be that if all nations would only join the CAB's
approach, it would solve the matter. Such an answer is, I fear,
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an oversimplication because other nations have other priorities
and requirements than does the United States. And absent the
conference machinery of IATA, the problems faced in the U.S.-
Scandinavian negotiations may be expected to become commonplace.
Next, before deregulation can be accepted in the inter-
national community, a better assessment of how it is working
domestically in the United States is essential. When nations,
have different economies and different policy goals, a nation's
domestic policy cannot be imposed in the international field but
must be negotiated. As Mr. Taylor, President of IATA, said in
his May 20 speech to the International Aviation Club in
Washington:
"Domestic policy deals with a single country and
a single, complex but close knit economy in which
there is an overriding national interest and in
which regional concerns can be harmonized through
compromises which do not conflict with the
central aim of policy.
"International policy on the other hand
cannot ignore vital interests of other nations
and these interests must be harmonized with one
another through negotiation which gives due
weight to everybody's concern: They cannot be
harmonized on the basis of a unilateral policy
goal which not everybody accepts."
Thus, before you accept the U.S. policy in preference to your
own, you are entitled to ask and be given a conclusive answer as
to how deregulation works in U.S. domestic 'air transportation.
And, as I noted earlier, a definitive answer is not yet avail-
able. There has been deregulation as to service, but there has
not been deregulation as to pricing and there has been a drastic
increase in regulation in the so-called consumer area. You
cannot and will not be able to tell if deregulation works until
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they completely deregulate the industry and it goes through at
least a full cycle of good and bad times.
The final and most serious question which I think needs to
be asked and answered is what is the fallback position if deregu-
lation does not work. You must remember that those who started
the deregulation movement are predominantly academicians who
having now obtained the reins of power in the government are like
children in a candy store trying first this academic theory and
then that. As one with formal training in economics -- an his-
torical accident which I try to keep hidden, and my economist
friends say I hide it very well indeed -- I can understand
wanting to try out various theories many of which can only be
proven or disproven by actual experience. My criticism of the
current aeronautical breed, however, is that I do not believe
they have any fallback position if the deregulation experiment
does not work. Indeed, back in 1978, the May 15 Aviation Daily
quoted the then Chairman of the Board, Mr. Kahn, as having told a
Washington audience:
"If we get the structure of this industry
changed, you are going to have one hell of a time
getting it back to where it was."
Boy, was he right! But, subsequent to that comment, and
while Mr. Kahn was still Chairman of the Board, I raised an issue
at an oral argument as to what the Board would do if the theories
turned out to be wrong.
Now, Mr. Kahn has always been good with a fast answer. He
is a master of supporting his economic theory, and he doesn't
duck an argument. But there has been no answer to the question
"what if you're wrong."
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It may be that Mr. Kahn did not understand the question, or
it may be that he was unwilling even to entertain the possibility
that an economic theory might be wrong. But it concerns me
deeply when government decides to make major changes of the sort
involved in deregulation yet has no apparent fallback position in
case things don't work out. While somebody may think that is an
acceptable risk when you are dealing strictly with internal
domestic aviation matters, I do not think it is an acceptable
risk in the international field. I think foreign governments
must ask and are entitled to a definitive answer -- "What if it
doesn't work? Is the U.S. willing to pick up the tab?"
And on that upbeat note, I'll be glad to take any questions
or expand on any of the points I earlier made.
